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Abstract
In this paper we discuss how to generate inductive invariants for safety verifi-
cation of hybrid systems. A hybrid symbolic-numeric method is presented to
compute inequality inductive invariants of the given systems. A numerical
invariant of the given system can be obtained by solving a parameterized
polynomial optimization problem via sum-of-squares (SOS) relaxation. And
a method based on Gauss-Newton refinement and rational vector recovery
is deployed to obtain the invariants with rational coefficients, which exactly
satisfy the conditions of invariants. Several examples are given to illustrate
our algorithm.
Keywords: semidefinite programming, sum-of-squares relaxation, safety
verification, invariant generation
1. Introduction
Complex physical systems are systems in which the techniques of sensing,
control, communication and coordination are involved and interacted with
✩This material is supported in part by the Chinese National Natural Science Foundation
under Grants 91018012(Wu, Yang, Zeng) and 10801052(Wu) and 10901055(Yang), and the
Scientific Research Project of The Graduate School of East China Normal University under
Grant CX2011009.
Email addresses: linwang@wzu.edu.cn (Wang Lin), mwu@sei.ecnu.edu.cn (Min
Wu), zfyang@sei.ecnu.edu.cn (Zhengfeng Yang), zbzeng@sei.ecnu.edu.cn
(Zhenbing Zeng)
Preprint submitted to Elsevier September 23, 2018
each other. Among complex physical systems, many of them are safety crit-
ical systems, such as airplanes, railway, and automotive applications. Due
to the complexity, ensuring correct functioning of these systems, e.g., spatial
separation, especially collision avoidance of aircrafts during the entire flights,
is among the most challenging and most important problems in computer sci-
ence, mathematics and engineering.
As a common mathematical model for complex physical systems, hybrid
systems [3, 8] are dynamical systems that are governed by interacting dis-
crete and continuous dynamics [1, 6, 8]. Continuous dynamics is specified
by differential equations, which is possibly subject to domain restrictions or
algebraic relations resulting from physical circumstances or the interaction of
continuous dynamics with discrete control. For discrete transitions, the hy-
brid system changes state instantaneously and possibly discontinuously, for
example, the instantaneous change of control variables like the acceleration
(e.g., the changing of a by setting a := −b with braking force b > 0).
The verification of hybrid systems is an important problem that has been
studied extensively both by the control theory, and the formal verification
community for over a decade. Among the most important verification ques-
tions for hybrid systems are those of safety, i.e., deciding whether a given
property ψ holds in all the reachable states, and the dual of safety, i.e., reach-
ability, deciding if there exists a trajectory starting from the initial set that
reaches a state satisfying the given property ψ. In principle, safety verifica-
tion or reachability analysis aims to show that all trajectories of the hybrid
systems starting from the initial set cannot enter some unsafe regions in the
state space.
Safety verification or reachability analysis of hybrid systems presents a
more difficult challenge, primarily due to the infinite number of possible states
in continuous state space. Some well-established techniques have been pro-
posed. In [2, 11], quantifier elimination was used to calculate exact reachable
sets for linear systems with certain eigenstructures and semialgebraic initial
sets. Tiwari [28] generalized this method to handle linear systems with al-
most arbitrary eigenstructures. In [5, 30, 10], level set methods, ellipsoidal
techniques and flow-pipe approximations have been presented for computing
approximate reachable sets of hybrid systems.
Recently, some methods [20, 21, 25, 28] based on invariant generation have
been proposed for safety verification of hybrid systems. An invariant [24] of
a hybrid system is a property that holds in all the reachable states of the
system, in other words, it is an over-approximation of all the reachable states
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of the system. Invariants are useful facts about the dynamics of a given
system, and are widely used in numerous approaches to analyze and verify
systems. For example, if the invariants lie inside the safe regions, or their
intersection with the unsafe regions is empty, then safety of hybrid systems
is verified.
The problem of generating invariants of an arbitrary form is known to
be computationally hard, intractable even for the simplest classes. The
usual technique for generating invariants is to produce an inductive invari-
ant, i.e., an assertion that holds at the initial states of the system, and is
preserved by all discrete and continuous state changes. There has been a
considerable volume of work towards invariant generation for hybrid sys-
tems using techniques in convex optimization, semi-algebraic system solving
[4, 7, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 29]. However, some of these techniques
are only applicable to linear systems, some are subject to numerical errors
and some suffer from high complexity. In virtue of the efficiency of nu-
merical computation and the error-free property of symbolic computation, a
hybrid symbolic-numeric method via SOS relaxation and exact certificate is
presented in [31] to construct inequality invariants for continuous dynamic
systems given by nonlinear vector fields.
In this work, we study how to generate inequality invariants for safety ver-
ification of nonlinear hybrid systems. We present a hybrid symbolic-numeric
method, based on sum-of-squares (SOS) relaxation via semidefinite program-
ming (SDP) and exact SOS representation recovery, to generate inequality
invariants of hybrid systems, which guarantee that all the reachable states
never enter the given unsafe regions. The idea is as follows: (1) Given a safe
property, we predeterminate the templates of the invariants, and construct
a semidefinite programming (SDP) system to solve the corresponding para-
metric polynomial optimization problem. (2) An exact invariant is obtained
by recovering the exact SOS representation from the approximate solution
of the associated SDP system. In the recovery step, Gauss-Newton iteration
is deployed to refine the approximate solution from SDP solver. Then safety
property of the hybrid systems can be easily verified, by the exact SOS rep-
resentations of the conditions of the invariants. More details will be shown
in Section 3.
Unlike the numerical approaches, our method can yield exact invariants,
which can overcome the unsoundness in the verification of hybrid systems
caused by numerical errors [19]. In comparison with some symbolic ap-
proaches of invariant generation based on qualifier elimination technique,
3
our approach is more efficient and practical, because parametric polynomial
optimization problem, based on SOS relaxation method, can be solved in
polynomial time theoretically.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
some notions about hybrid systems and invariants. Section 3 is devoted to
illustrating a symbolic-numeric approach to generate invariants for safety
verification of hybrid systems. In Section 4, we present some examples on
invariant generation for safety verification of hybrid systems. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper and discusses some future work.
2. Invariants
To model hybrid systems, we recall the definition of hybrid automata [8,
25].
Definition 1 (Hybrid system). A hybrid system H : 〈V, L, T ,Θ,D,Ψ, ℓ0〉
consists of the following components:
• V = {x1, ..., xn}, a set of real-valued system variables. A state is an
interpretation of V , assigning to each xi ∈ V a real value. An assertion
is a first-order formula over V . A state s satisfies an assertion ϕ,
written as s |= ϕ, if ϕ holds on the state s. We will also write ϕ1 |= ϕ2
for two assertions ϕ1, ϕ2 to denote that ϕ2 is true at least in all the
states in which ϕ1 is true;
• L, a finite set of locations;
• T , a set of (discrete) transitions. Each transition τ : 〈ℓ, ℓ′, gτ , ρτ 〉 ∈
T consists of a prelocation ℓ ∈ L, a postlocation ℓ′ ∈ L, the guard
condition gτ over V , and an assertion ρτ over V ∪ V
′ representing
the next-state relation, where V ′ = {x′1, ..., x
′
n} denotes the next-state
variables. Note that the transition τ can take place only if gτ holds;
• Θ, an assertion specifying the initial condition;
• D, a map that maps each location ℓ ∈ L to a differential rule (also
known as a vector field or a flow field) D(ℓ), of the form x˙i = fℓ,i(V )
for each xi ∈ V , written briefly as x˙ = fℓ(x). The differential rule at a
location specifies how the system variables evolve in that location;
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• Ψ, a map that maps each location ℓ ∈ L to a location condition (loca-
tion invariant) Ψ(ℓ), an assertion over V ;
• ℓ0 ∈ L, the initial condition. We assume that the initial condition
satisfies the location invariant at the initial location, that is, Θ |= Ψ(ℓ0).
By a state of a hybrid system H : 〈V, L, T ,Θ,D,Ψ, ℓ0〉, we mean the tuple
(ℓ,x) ∈ L× Rn where n is the number of program variables in H.
Definition 2 (Computation). [25] A computation of a hybrid system H is
an infinite sequence of states
< l0,x0 >, < l1,x1 >, · · · , < li,xi >, < li+1,xi+1 >, · · ·
such that
• [Initiation] l0 = ℓ0 and x0 |= Θ;
Furthermore, for each consecutive pair < li,xi >,< li+1,xi+1 >, one of
the two consecution conditions holds:
• [Discrete Consecution] There exists a transition τ : 〈ℓ, ℓ′, gτ , ρτ 〉
such that li = ℓ, li+1 = ℓ
′ and (xi,xi+1) |= ρτ (xi,xi+1) if gτ holds, or
• [Continuous Consecution] li = li+1 = ℓ, and there exists a time
interval δ > 0 and a smooth (continuous and differentiable to all or-
ders) function f : [0, δ] → Rn s.t. f evolves from xi to xi+1 according
to the differential rule D(ℓ) at location ℓ, while satisfying the location
invariant Ψ(ℓ). Formally,
– f(0) = xi, f(δ) = xi+1 and ∀t ∈ [0, δ], f(t) |= Ψ(ℓ),
– ∀t ∈ [0, δ), (f(t), f˙(t)) |= D(ℓ).
A state 〈ℓ,x〉 is a reachable state of a hybrid system H if it appears in a
computation of H.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of a hybrid system with two loca-
tions ℓ1, ℓ2. A state of this hybrid system is denoted by 〈ℓ,x〉 ∈ {ℓ1, ℓ2}×Rn,
and the initial state set is ℓ1 × Θ. During a continuous flow, the discrete
location ℓi is maintained and the continuous state variables x evolve accord-
ing to the differential equations x˙ = fℓi(x), with x satisfying the location
invariant Ψ(ℓi). At the state 〈ℓi,x〉, if the guard condition g(ℓi, ℓj) is met,
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x˙ = f1(x) x˙ = f2(x)
Ψ(ℓ2)
ℓ2ℓ1
Ψ(ℓ1)
Initial: Θ
g(ℓ1, ℓ2)
ρ(ℓ1, ℓ2)
g(ℓ2, ℓ1)
ρ(ℓ2, ℓ1)
Figure 1: An example of hybrid system H
the system may undergo a transition to location ℓj, and x will take the new
value x′, which is determined by the reset map ρ(ℓi, ℓj).
Given a hybrid system with an initial set and a prespecified safe (or
unsafe) region, the system is safe if starting from any state in the initial
set, this system would never evolve to the given unsafe region or the system
would always stay inside the safe region. More specifically, consider the
hybrid system H shown in Figure 1 and let Xu ⊂ Rn be an unsafe region.
The system H is said to be safe if all trajectories of the system starting from
any state in 〈ℓ1,x0〉 ∈ ℓ1 × Θ can not reach Xu, or any state in Xu is not
reachable.
In this work, we will apply the invariant generation method to verify
safety of hybrid systems. The following definitions of invariants of hybrid
systems come from [25].
Definition 3 (Invariant). An invariant of a hybrid system at location ℓ is
an assertion I such that for any reachable state 〈ℓ,x〉 of the hybrid system,
x |= I.
An invariant of a hybrid system is an assertion that holds in all the reach-
able states of the system.
The problem to generate invariants with arbitrary form is known to be
computationally hard, intractable even for the simplest classes. The usual
technique for generating invariants is to compute inductive invariants, defined
as follows.
Definition 4 (Inductive invariant). An inductive assertion map I of a hy-
brid system H : 〈V, L, T ,Θ,D,Ψ, ℓ0〉 is a map that associates with each lo-
cation ℓ ∈ L an assertion I(ℓ) that holds initially and is preserved by all
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discrete transitions and continuous flows of H. More formally, an inductive
assertion map satisfies the following requirements:
(i) [Initial] Θ |= I(ℓ0).
(ii) [Discrete Consecution] For each discrete transition τ : 〈ℓ, ℓ′, gτ , ρτ 〉,
starting from a state satisfying I(ℓ), and taking τ leads to a state sat-
isfying I(ℓ′). Formally,
I(ℓ) ∧ gτ ∧ ρτ |= I(ℓ
′)
where I(ℓ′) represents the assertion I(ℓ) with the current state vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn replaced by the next state variables x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n, respec-
tively.
(iii) [Continuous Consecution] For every location ℓ ∈ L and states 〈ℓ,x1〉,
〈ℓ,x2〉 such that x2 evolves from x1 according to the differential rule D(ℓ)
at ℓ, if x1 |= I(ℓ) then x2 |= I(ℓ).
Our definition of inductive invariants is slightly modified from that of
Definition 4 in [25], and the only change made is taking the guard conditions
into account.
For a hybrid system, a formula I(x) is called a differential invariant at
location ℓ if I(x) satisfies conditions (i) and (iii), that is, I(x) holds initially
and is preserved by the continuous flow at a single location. There are sev-
eral literature to compute differential invariants. [13] presented an approach
based on the computable algebraic-geometry theory to generate differential
invariants. [20] computed differential invariants using a verification logic for
hybrid systems. [31] suggested a hybrid symbolic-numeric method to com-
pute inequality differential invariants.
Remark 1. Clearly, inductive invariants are over-approximation of the reach-
able sets of hybrid systems, since an inductive invariant is true for all the
reachable states of the system.
3. Safety Verification of Hybrid Systems
The aim of this section is to translate the problem of safety verification
of hybrid systems into that of generating invariants, which can be trans-
formed further into polynomial optimization problem with parameters. We
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will present a hybrid symbolic-numeric method, based on SOS relaxation, to
solve this polynomial optimization problem, and obtain the invariants, which
can guarantee the safety property of hybrid systems.
3.1. Invariants and Safety Verification
In this paper, we are interested in hybrid systems in which the relations
are given by (real) polynomials over the system variables. Then we define
Definition 5 (Polynomial Hybrid System). A polynomial hybrid system is
a hybrid system: H : 〈V, L, T , Θ,D,Ψ, ℓ0〉, where
• for each transition τ : 〈ℓ, ℓ′, gτ , ρτ 〉 ∈ T , the guard condition gτ (resp.
the reset relation ρτ) is a conjunction of polynomial inequalities over V
(resp. V ∪ V ′); also, the initial condition Θ and the location invari-
ant Ψ(ℓ), for each ℓ ∈ L, are conjunctions of polynomial inequalities
over V ;
• each rule D(ℓ) is of the form x˙i = fℓ,i(x) for each xi ∈ V , where
fℓ,i(x) ∈ R[x].
We are interested in finding invariants of the form ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 at loca-
tion ℓ ∈ L. Below is an alternative expression of Definition 4.
Theorem 1. Let H : 〈V, L, T , Θ,D,Ψ, ℓ0〉 be a hybrid system. Suppose
for each location ℓ ∈ L, there exists a function ϕℓ(x) satisfying the following
conditions:
(i) Θ |= ϕℓ0(x) ≥ 0,
(ii) ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0∧ g(ℓ, ℓ
′)∧ ρ(ℓ, ℓ′) |= ϕℓ′(x
′) ≥ 0, for any transition 〈ℓ, ℓ′, g, ρ〉
going out from ℓ,
(iii) ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 ∧Ψ(ℓ) |= ϕ˙ℓ(x) > 0, here ϕ˙ℓ(x) denotes the Lie-derivative of
ϕℓ along the vector field D(ℓ), i.e., ϕ˙ℓ(x) =
∑n
i=1
∂ϕℓ
∂xi
· fℓ,i(x),
then ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 is an invariant of the hybrid system H at location ℓ.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Definition 4.
Remarked that if the functions ϕℓ(x) at all locations are identical to ϕ(x),
then ϕ(x) is an inductive invariant of the given hybrid system, as described
in the following theorem.
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Theorem 2. Let H be a hybrid system. Suppose there exists a function ϕ(x)
satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Θ |= ϕ(x) ≥ 0,
(ii) ϕ(x) ≥ 0 ∧ g(ℓ, ℓ′) ∧ ρ(ℓ, ℓ′) |= ϕ(x′) ≥ 0, for any transition 〈ℓ, ℓ′, g, ρ〉
going out from ℓ,
(iii) ϕ(x) ≥ 0 ∧Ψ(ℓ) |= ϕ˙(x) > 0,
then ϕ(x) ≥ 0 is an inductive invariant of the system H.
In the sequel, for brevity, we shall use ϕℓ(x) to denote both the invari-
ant ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 and ϕℓ(x).
The following theorem shows that invariants can be applied to verify the
safety property of hybrid systems.
Theorem 3. Let H be a hybrid system, and Xu(ℓ) be the unsafe region at
location ℓ. Suppose there exists functions ϕℓ(x), for ℓ ∈ L, that satisfy the
conditions (i-iii) in Theorem 1, and moreover,
(iv) Xu(ℓ) |= ϕℓ(x) < 0, ∀ℓ ∈ L,
then the safety of the system H is guaranteed.
Proof. Clearly, ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 is an invariant of hybrid system H at location ℓ.
Then the condition (iv) implies that all reachable sets at location ℓ lie outside
the unsafe region Xu(ℓ), yielding the safety of the system.
Similarly, inductive invariants can be applied to verify safety of hybrid
systems.
Theorem 4. Let H be a hybrid system, and Xu(ℓ) be the unsafe region at
location ℓ. Suppose there exists a function ϕ(x) that satisfies the conditions
(i-iii) in Theorem 2, and moreover,
(iv) Xu(ℓ) |= ϕ(x) < 0, ∀ℓ ∈ L,
then the safety of the system is guaranteed.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.
Remark 2. Functions ϕℓ(x) and ϕ(x) in Theorems 3 and 4 are also known
as barrier certificates in [21].
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3.2. Sum of Squares Relaxation
According to Theorems 3 and 4, to verify the safety of hybrid system H,
it suffices to compute real polynomials ϕℓ(x) or ϕ(x).
In the following, we only discuss how to find the invariant ϕℓ(x) at each
location ℓ ∈ L. The problem of computing the inductive invariant ϕ(x) can
be handled similarly.
Our idea of computing ϕℓ(x) or ϕ(x), based on Sum-of-Squares (SOS)
relaxation and rational vector recovery, is as follows.
Step 1: Predetermine a template of polynomial invariants with the given
degree and convert the problem of computing polynomial invariants
to the associated parametric polynomial optimization problem. SOS
relaxation method is then applied to obtain a polynomial invariant
with floating point coefficients.
Step 2: Apply Gauss-Newton refinement and rational vector recovery on
the approximate polynomial invariant to get polynomials with rational
coefficients, which exactly satisfy the conditions of invariants of the
given hybrid system.
The problem of computing the invariant ϕℓ(x) at each location ℓ ∈ L, that
satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3 can be transformed into the following
problem
find ϕℓ(x) ∈ R[x], ∀ℓ ∈ L
s.t. Θ |= ϕℓ0(x) ≥ 0,
ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 ∧ g(ℓ, ℓ
′) ∧ ρ(ℓ, ℓ′) |= ϕℓ′(x
′) ≥ 0,
ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 ∧Ψ(ℓ) |= ϕ˙ℓ(x) > 0,
Xu(ℓ) |= ϕℓ(x) < 0.


(1)
Let us first predetermine a template of polynomial invariants with the
given degree d, that is, we assume
ϕℓ(x) =
∑
α
cαx
α, (2)
where xα = xα11 · · ·x
αn
n and cα ∈ R are parameters, with α ∈ Z
n
≥0 and∑n
i=1 αi ≤ d. One can apply quantifier elimination methods to solve the
corresponding parametric semi-algebraic systems, and for the given tem-
plate, quantifier elimination methods can yield the sufficient and necessary
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conditions for the existence of invariants. Several Maple packages, such as
RAGLib[16] and DISCOVERER [32], are available to solve this problem.
However, quantifier elimination method based on the cylindrical algebraic
decomposition (CAD) are of high complexity. Instead, we will explore the
SOS relaxation techniques based on semidefinite programming (SDP) solving
to obtain polynomial invariants.
In the sequel, we suppose that
Θ = {x ∈ Rn :
q∧
l=1
θl(x) ≥ 0}, Xu(ℓ) = {x ∈ R
n :
p∧
j=1
ζℓ,j(x) ≥ 0},
Ψ(ℓ) = {x ∈ Rn :
r∧
k=1
ψℓ,k(x) ≥ 0}, g(ℓ, ℓ
′) = {x ∈ Rn :
s∧
i=1
gℓℓ′, i(x) ≥ 0},
ρ(ℓ, ℓ′)(x,x′) = {x′ ∈ Rn :
t∧
u=1
ρℓℓ′,u(x,x
′) ≥ 0},
where ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ L, and θl(x), ζℓ,j(x), ψℓ,k(x), gℓℓ′, i(x) and ρℓℓ′,u(x,x
′) are poly-
nomials.
Clearly, a sufficient condition for r(x) ∈ R[x] with degree 2e to be positive
semidefinite is that there exists an SOS of r(x):
r(x) =
∑
i
ri
2(x), with ri(x) ∈ R[x], (3)
or, equivalently, r(x) can be represented as
r(x) = m(x)T ·W ·m(x),
where W is a real symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix, and m(x) is
a vector of terms in R[x] with degree ≤ e.
When a polynomial r(x) can be written as an SOS in R[x], we simply call
r(x) an SOS. Denote by Σn,2e the set of all SOSes of degree ≤ 2e in variables
x1, ..., xn, i.e.,
Σn,2e = {r(x) ∈ R[x] : r(x) is an SOS, deg(r(x)) ≤ 2e}.
Based on the SOS relaxation, the constraints in (1) can be replaced by
stronger ones. For instance, to find a polynomial ϕℓ0(x) satisfying
Θ |= ϕℓ0(x) ≥ 0
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it suffices to find ϕℓ0(x) such that
ϕℓ0(x) = σ0(x) +
q∑
l=1
σl(x)θl(x),
where σ0, σl ∈ R[x] are SOSes. Therefore, the problem of computing poly-
nomials ϕℓ(x) is transformed into the following SOS program:
find ϕℓ(x) ∈ R[x], ∀ℓ ∈ L
s.t. ϕℓ0(x) = σ0(x) +
∑q
l=1 σl(x)θl(x),
ϕℓ′(x
′) = λℓℓ′,0(x) +
∑s
i=1 λℓℓ′,i(x)gℓℓ′,i(x)
+
∑t
u=1 γℓℓ′,u(x)ρℓℓ′,u(x,x
′) + ηℓℓ′(x)ϕℓ(x),
ϕ˙ℓ(x) = φℓ,0(x) +
∑r
k=1 φℓ,k(x)ψℓ,k(x) + νℓ(x)ϕℓ(x) + ǫℓ,1
−ϕℓ(x) = µℓ,0(x) +
∑p
j=1 µℓ,j(x)ζℓ,j(x) + ǫℓ,2,


(4)
where σl(x), λℓℓ′,i(x), γℓℓ′,u(x), ηℓℓ′(x), φℓ,k(x), νℓ(x), µℓ,j(x) ∈ Σn,2e and ǫℓ,1,
ǫℓ,2 ∈ R+. The decision variables are the coefficients of all polynomials
appearing in (4), such as ϕℓ(x), σl(x), λℓℓ′,i(x).
Since the coefficients of ϕℓ(x), ηℓℓ′(x) and νℓ(x) are unknown, some non-
linear terms that are products of these coefficients, occur in the second and
third constraints of (4). The SOS relaxation will then lead to a non-convex
bilinear matrix inequalities (BMI) problem. To avoid BMI problem, we adopt
stronger conditions to compute the invariants of hybrid systems.
Theorem 5. Under the assumptions in Theorem 1, suppose for each ℓ ∈ L,
ϕℓ(x) satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Θ |= ϕℓ0(x) ≥ 0,
(ii’) g(ℓ, ℓ′) ∧ ρ(ℓ, ℓ′) |= ϕℓ′(x
′) ≥ 0, for any transition 〈ℓ, ℓ′, g, ρ〉 going out
from ℓ,
(iii’) Ψ(ℓ) |= ϕ˙ℓ(x) > 0,
then ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 is an invariant of the hybrid system H at location ℓ. In
addition, if ϕℓ(x) satisfies
(iv) Xu(ℓ) |= ϕℓ(x) < 0, ∀ℓ ∈ L,
then the safety of the system is guaranteed.
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Proof. Since the conditions (ii’) and (iii’) are stronger than the conditions
(ii) and (iii) in Theorem 1 respectively, ϕℓ is an invariant at location ℓ.
According to Theorem 3, the condition (iv) can guarantee the safety of this
system.
A similar conclusion can be attained for inductive invariants, as stated in
the following
Theorem 6. Under the assumptions in Theorem 2, suppose there exists a
polynomial ϕ(x) satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Θ |= ϕ(x) ≥ 0,
(ii’) g(ℓ, ℓ′) ∧ ρ(ℓ, ℓ′) |= ϕ(x′) ≥ 0, for any transition 〈ℓ, ℓ′, g, ρ〉 going out
from ℓ,
(iii’) Ψ(ℓ) |= ϕ˙(x) > 0, ∀ℓ ∈ L,
then ϕ(x) ≥ 0 is an inductive invariant of the hybrid system H. In addition,
if ϕ(x) satisfies
(iv) Xu(ℓ) |= ϕ(x) < 0, ∀ℓ ∈ L,
then the safety of the system is guaranteed.
Having Theorem 5, the program (4) can be modified into the following
problem:
find ϕℓ(x) ∈ R[x], ∀ℓ ∈ L
s.t. ϕℓ0(x) = σ0(x) +
∑q
l=1 σl(x)θl(x),
ϕℓ′(x
′) = λℓℓ′,0(x) +
∑s
i=1 λℓℓ′,i(x)gℓℓ′,i(x) +
∑t
u=1 γℓℓ′,u(x)ρℓℓ′,u(x,x
′),
ϕ˙ℓ(x) = φℓ,0(x) +
∑r
k=1 φℓ,k(x)ψℓ,k(x) + ǫℓ,1,
−ϕℓ(x) = µℓ,0(x) +
∑p
j=1 µℓ,j(x)ζℓ,j(x) + ǫℓ,2,


(5)
where σl(x), λℓℓ′,i(x), γℓℓ′,u(x), φℓ,k(x), µℓ,j(x) ∈ Σn,2e and ǫℓ,1, ǫℓ,2 ∈ R+. The
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program is equivalent to the following SDP problem:
inf Tr(M,W, V, P,Q)
s.t. ϕℓ0(x) = m0(x)
T ·M [0] ·m0(x) +
∑q
l=1ml(x)
T ·M [l] ·ml(x)θl(x),
ϕℓ′(x
′) = wℓℓ′,0(x)
T ·W [ℓℓ
′,0] ·wℓℓ′,0(x)
+
∑s
i=1wℓℓ′,i(x)
T ·W [ℓℓ
′,i] ·wℓℓ′,i(x)gℓℓ′,i(x)
+
∑t
u=1 vℓℓ′,u(x)
T · V [ℓℓ
′,u] · vℓℓ′,u(x)ρℓℓ′,u(x,x
′),
ϕ˙ℓ(x) = pℓ,0(x)
T · P [ℓ,0] · pℓ,0(x)
+
∑r
k=1 pℓ,k(x)
T · P [ℓ,k] · pℓ,k(x)ψℓ,k(x) + ǫℓ,1,
ϕℓ(x) = −qℓ,0(x)
T ·Q[ℓ,0] · qℓ,0(x)
−
∑p
j=1 qℓ,j(x)
T ·Q[ℓ,j] · qℓ,j(x)ζℓ,j(x)− ǫℓ,2,


(6)
where all the matricesM [l],W [ℓℓ
′,i], V [ℓℓ
′,u], P [ℓ,k], Q[ℓ,j] are symmetric and pos-
itive semidefinite, and the function Tr(M,W, V, P,Q) denotes the sum of
traces of all these matrices, which acts as a dummy objective function com-
monly used in SDP for optimization problem with no objective function.
Many Matlab packages of SDP solvers, such as SOSTOOLS [22], YALMIP
[14], and SeDuMi [26], are available to solve the problem (6) efficiently.
3.3. Exact Certificate of Sum of Squares Decomposition
Since the SDP solvers in Matlab is running in fixed precision, the tech-
niques in Section 3.2 will yield numerical solutions to the associated SDP
problem (6), where the numerical polynomial ϕℓ(x) and numerical positive
semidefinite matrices M [l], . . . , Q[ℓ,j] satisfy the constraints in (6) approxi-
mately, for instance,
ϕℓ0(x) ≈ m0(x)
T ·M [0] ·m0(x) +
∑q
l=1ml(x)
T ·M [l] ·ml(x)θl(x), M
[l] v 0.
(7)
However, due to round-off errors, ϕℓ(x) ≥ 0 may not necessarily be an
invariant of the given hybrid system at location ℓ, because the constraints
in (6) may not hold exactly, for example, (7) means that ϕℓ0(x) may not
be positive semidefinite exactly within the initial set Θ. Therefore in the
next step, from the numerical polynomials ϕℓ(x) and the numerical positive
semidefinite matrices M [l], . . . , Q[ℓ,j], we will recover polynomials ϕ˜ℓ(x) with
rational coefficients, which satisfy (6) exactly.
As described in [9], finding a polynomial with rational coefficients can
be translated into the problem of rational vector recovery. In Section 3.2,
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a numerical vector v∗ℓ denoting the coefficient (column) vector of ϕℓ(x) is
obtained by solving the SDP system, i.e., ϕℓ(x) = v
∗
ℓ
T ·Tℓ(x), where Tℓ(x) is
the column vector of all terms in ϕℓ(x). To obtain a rational vector v˜ℓ near
to v∗ℓ , we can employ the simultaneous Diophantine approximation algorithm
[12], once the bound of the common denominator of v˜ℓ is given.
The recovery of the matricesM [l], . . . , Q[ℓ,j] into rational positive semidefi-
nite matrices is split into two steps. We first recover the matrices M˜ [l], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,j]
for 1 ≤ l ≤ q, . . . , 1 ≤ j ≤ p and then recover M˜ [0], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,0]. To illustrate
the idea, we only discuss how to recover M [l] for 1 ≤ l ≤ q and the matri-
ces W [ℓℓ
′,i], V [ℓℓ
′,u], P [ℓ,k], Q[ℓ,j] can be recovered similarly.
Given the numerical positive semidefinite matrices M [l], 1 ≤ l ≤ q in (6),
we can find the nearby rational positive semidefinite matrices M˜ [l] by use of
the rational vector recovery technique. In practice, all the M [l] are numerical
diagonal matrices, in other words, the off-diagonal entries are very tiny and
the diagonal entries are nonnegative. Therefore, by setting the small entries
of M [l] to be zeros we easily get the nearby rational positive semidefinite
matrices M [l] for l = 1, . . . , q. The nearby rational positive semidefinite
matrices W˜ [ℓℓ
′,i], V˜ [ℓℓ
′,u], P˜ [ℓ,k], Q˜[ℓ,j] can be recovered similarly.
Having ϕ˜ℓ(x) = v˜ℓ
T ·Tℓ(x) and M˜
[l], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,j] for 1 ≤ l ≤ q, . . . , 1 ≤ j ≤ p,
the program (6) is converted to
inf Tr(M [0],W [ℓℓ
′,0], P [ℓ,0], Q[ℓ,0])
s.t. ϕ˜ℓ0(x)−
∑q
l=1ml(x)
T · M˜ [l] ·ml(x)θl(x)
≈m0(x)
T ·M [0] ·m0(x),
ϕ˜ℓ′(x
′)−
∑s
i=1wℓℓ′,i(x)
T · W˜ [ℓℓ
′,i] ·wℓℓ′,i(x)gℓℓ′,i(x)
−
∑t
u=1 vℓℓ′,u(x)
T · V˜ [ℓℓ
′,u] · vℓℓ′,u(x)ρℓℓ′,u(x,x
′)
≈ wℓℓ′,0(x)
T ·W [ℓℓ
′,0] ·wℓℓ′,0(x)
˙˜ϕℓ(x)−
∑r
k=1 pℓ,k(x)
T · P˜ [ℓ,k] · pℓ,k(x)ψℓ,k(x)− ǫ˜ℓ,1
≈ pℓ,0(x)
T · P [ℓ,0] · pℓ,0(x)
ϕ˜ℓ(x) +
∑p
j=1 qℓ,j(x)
T · Q˜[ℓ,j] · qℓ,j(x)ζℓ,j(x) + ǫ˜ℓ,2
≈ −qℓ,0(x)
T ·Q[ℓ,0] · qℓ,0(x)


(8)
Observing (8), the matrices M [0], . . . , Q[ℓ,0] have floating point entries, while
the matrices M˜ [l], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,j] are rational positive semidefinite matrices. There-
fore, the remaining task is to find nearby rational positive semidefinite ma-
trices M˜ [0], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,0] such that the constraints in (8) hold exactly. To fulfil
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this task, we can first apply Gauss-Newton iteration to refine M [0], . . . , Q[ℓ,0],
and then recover the rational positive definite matrices M˜ [0], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,0] re-
spectively from the refined M [0], . . . , Q[ℓ,0], by orthogonal projection if the
involved matrix is of full rank, or by rational vector recovery method other-
wise.
Finally, we check if all the matrices M˜ [0], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,0] are positive semidefi-
nite. If so, then return ϕ˜ℓ(x) ≥ 0 as an invariant of the given hybrid system
at location ℓ ∈ L; otherwise, return ”we cannot find invariants of the given
degree bound”.
Remark 3. The above technique based on SOS relaxation and exact polyno-
mial recovery can be applied to computing the inductive invariants of hybrid
systems, which guarantee the safety of the given hybrid system.
3.4. Algorithm
The discussion in Section 3.3 leads to an algorithm of computing the
(inductive) invariants of polynomial hybrid systems. As stated above, we
only present how to compute the invariants ϕℓ(x), for ℓ ∈ L, that satisfy (6),
and the case of computing the inductive invariants is similar.
Algorithm Polynomial Inequality Invariant Generation
Input: ◮ H : 〈V, L, T ,Θ,D,Ψ, ℓ0〉 a polynomial hybrid system.
◮ d ∈ Z>0: the degree bound of the candidate polynomial invari-
ants.
◮ D ∈ Z>0: the bound of the common denominator of the coeffi-
cient vector of the polynomial invariants.
◮ e ∈ Z≥0: the degree bound 2e of the SOSes used to construct
the SDP system.
◮ τ ∈ R>0: the given tolerance.
Output: ◮ ϕ˜ℓ(x) ≥ 0: the verified polynomia invariant at each location
ℓ ∈ L.
1. Compute the candidates of polynomial invariants
(i) For each locaiton ℓ ∈ L, predetermine the templates of ϕℓ(x), with
degree d, and construct an SDP system of the form (6), where the
degree bounds of all the involved SOSes are 2e.
• If the SDP system (6) has no feasible solutions,
return ”we can’t find polynomial invariants with degree ≤ d
at each location”;
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• Otherwise,
obtain a numerical vector v∗ℓ , numerical constants ǫℓ,1, ǫℓ,2 and
numerical positive semidefinite matrices M [l], W [ℓℓ
′,i], V [ℓℓ
′,u],
P [ℓ,k], Q[ℓ,j] for 0 ≤ l ≤ q, 0 ≤ i ≤ s, 1 ≤ u ≤ t, 0 ≤ k ≤ r, 0 ≤
j ≤ p.
(ii) For the common denominator bound D, compute from v∗ℓ a ratio-
nal vector v˜ℓ by Diophantine approximation algorithm, and get
the associated rational polynomial ϕ˜ℓ(x). Similarly, the nearby
positive contants ǫ˜ℓ,1 and ǫ˜ℓ,2 are obtained.
(iii) Convert all the M [l], . . . , Q[ℓ,j] into rational and positive semidefi-
nite matrices M˜ [l], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,j], for 1 ≤ l ≤ q, . . . , 1 ≤ j ≤ p.
2. Compute the exact SOS decomposition
(i) Reconstruct an SDP system of the form (8) to get approximate
positive semidefinite matrices M [0], . . . , Q[ℓ,0] satisfying (8).
(ii) Apply Gauss-Newton iteration to refine the matricesM [0], . . . , Q[ℓ,0]
obtained in Step 2 (i).
(iii) From the refined M [0], . . . , Q[ℓ,0], compute the rational matrices
M˜ [0], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,0] respectively by orthogonal projection method if
the involved matrix is of full rank, or by rational vector recovery
if the matrix is singular.
(iv) Check whether all the matrices M˜ [0], . . . , Q˜[ℓ,0] are positive semidef-
inite.
• If so, return ϕ˜ℓ(x) ≥ 0 as an invariant at location ℓ ∈ L;
• Otherwise,
return ”we can’t find polynomial invariants with degree ≤ d.”
Remark 4. Our algorithm cannot guarantee rational solutions will always
be found since there exists limitations in the above algorithm on choosing
the degree bound e and the common denominator bound D. Furthermore,
it is difficult to determine in advance whether there exists invariants with
rational coefficients or not. Therefore, even if our algorithm cannot find the
invariants, it does not mean that the given hybrid system has no invariants
with the given degree bound d.
4. Experiments
In this section, some examples are presented to illustrate our method for
safety verification of hybrid systems.
17
Example 1. [23, Example CLOCK] Consider a nonlinear continuous system[
x˙
y˙
]
=
[
−11
2
y + y2
6x− x2
]
,
with location invariant Ψ = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : 1 ≤ x ≤ 5 ∧ 1 ≤ y ≤ 5}. The
problem is to verify that all trajectories of the system starting from the initial
set Θ = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : 4 ≤ x ≤ 4.5 ∧ y = 1} will never reach the unsafe
set Xu = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : 1 ≤ x ≤ 2 ∧ 2 ≤ y ≤ 3}. The safety of the
continuous system can be verified if we can find a polynomial ϕ(x, y) which
satisfies conditions in Theorem 5. We rewrite Θ, Xu,Ψ as follows
Θ = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : θ1(x, y) ≥ 0 ∧ θ2(x, y) ≥ 0 ∧ θ3(x, y) ≥ 0},
Ψ = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : ψ1(x, y) ≥ 0 ∧ ψ2(x, y) ≥ 0},
Xu = {(x, y) ∈ R
2 : ζ1(x, y) ≥ 0 ∧ ζ2(x, y) ≥ 0},
where
θ1(x, y) = (4− x)(x− 4.5), θ2(x, y) = y − 1, θ3(x, y) = 1− y,
ψ1(x, y) = (1− x)(x− 5), ψ2(x, y) = (1− y)(y − 5),
ζ1(x, y) = (1− x)(x− 2), ζ2(x, y) = (2− y)(y − 3).
Assuming deg(ϕ(x, y)) = d, for d = 1, 2, ... and the degree bound of all the
involved SOSes in the program (5) is 2e = 10. Then the SOS program (5)
becomes
ϕ(x, y) = σ0(x, y) + σ1(x, y)θ1(x, y) + σ2(x, y)θ2(x, y) + σ3(x, y)θ3(x, y),
ϕ˙(x, y) = φ0(x, y) + φ1(x, y)ψ1(x, y) + φ2(x, y)ψ2(x, y) + ǫ1,
−ϕ(x, y) = µ0(x, y) + µ1(x, y)ζ1(x, y) + µ2(x, y)ζ2(x, y) + ǫ2,
where σi(x, y), φj(x, y), µk(x, y) ∈ Σ2,2e, ǫ1, ǫ2 ∈ R+. We apply the algorithm
in Section 3.4, and increment d by 1 from 1 to 10 until a feasible solution of
the SDP system is obtained. When d = 4, we obtain a feasible solution of
the associated SDP system. Here we just list one approximate polynomial
ϕ(x, y) = −4.3296− 1.2975x− 0.10418y + 0.92562x2 + 0.18428xy
+ 0.35738y2 + ...+ 0.94032× 10−6x4 + 0.17047× 10−5y4.
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Let the tolerance τ = 10−2, and the bound of the common denominator of
the polynomial coefficients vector be 1000. By use of the rational SOS re-
covery technique described in Section 3.3, we obtain all the corresponding
polynomials with rational coefficients, for instance,
ϕ˜(x, y) = −
4113
950
−
1233
950
x−
99
950
y+
879
950
x2+
34
95
y2+
7
38
xy−
6
475
xy2−
46
475
x3.
Furthermore, a certificate of SOS representation shows ϕ˜(x, y) satisfies the
conditions in Theorem 5 exactly. Therefore, the safety of this continuous
system is proved.
Example 2. [23, Example ECO] Consider a predator-prey hybrid system
depicted in Figure 2, where
f1(x) = f2(x) =
(
−x1 + x1x2
x2 − x1x2
)
.
   
 
(x1 − 1.1)(x1 − 1.9) ≤ 0
x˙ = f2(x)
(x2 − 1.1)(x2 − 1.9) ≤ 0
Θ (x1 − 0.1)(x1 − 0.9) ≤ 0
(x2 − 0.1)(x2 − 0.9) ≤ 0
g(1, 2) : (x2 − 0.875)(x2 − 0.9) ≤ 0
ρ(1, 2) : (x1 − 1.2)
2 + (x2 − 1.8)
2 ≤ 0.01
g(2, 1) : (x2 − 1.1)(x2 − 1.125) ≤ 0
ρ(2, 1) : (x1 − 0.7)
2 + (x2 − 0.7)
2 ≤ 0.01
ℓ2ℓ1
x˙ = f1(x)
Figure 2: Hybrid system of example 2
The system starts in location ℓ1, with an initial state in
Θ = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : (x1 − 0.8)
2 + (x2 − 0.2)
2 ≤ 0.01}.
Our task is to verify the system never reach the states in
Xu(ℓ1) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : 0.8 ≤ x1 ≤ 0.9 ∧ 0.8 ≤ x2 ≤ 0.9}.
To verify the safety of this system, we need find the corresponding invari-
ant polynomials ϕ1(x1, x2) and ϕ2(x1, x2) at locations ℓ1 and ℓ2, respectively.
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Similar to Example 1, we construct the associated SOS system, and find
the feasible numerical solutions from SDP solver:
ϕ1 = 0.34871− 0.45903x1 + 0.018001x2 + 0.2212x
2
1 − 0.45764x1x2 + 0..17991x
2
2,
ϕ2 = 0.011167 + 1.2891x1 + 0.56568x2 + 0.88855x
2
1 − 0.56553x1x2 − 0..18386x
2
2.
Let the tolerance τ = 10−2, and the bound of the common denominator
of the polynomial coefficients vector be 1000. By use of the rational SOS
recovery technique , we obtain all the corresponding polynomials with rational
coefficients. The invariant polynomials with rational coefficients are
ϕ˜1(x1, x2) =
329
944
−
433
944
x1 +
17
944
x2 −
27
59
x1x2 +
209
944
x21 +
85
472
x22,
ϕ˜2(x1, x2) =
11
944
+
1217
944
x1 +
267
472
x2 −
267
472
x1x2 +
839
944
x21 −
87
472
x22.
Furthermore, all the remaining related polynomials in (5) can be written as
SOSes of the polynomials, which means ϕ˜1 and ϕ˜2 satisfy all the conditions
in Theorem 5. So the safety of hybrid system is proved.
   
 
x˙ = f2(x)
Θ
ℓ2ℓ1
x˙ = f1(x)
g(1, 2) : (x2 − 1.6)(x2 − 2) ≤ 0
ρ(2, 1) : (x1 − 1)
2 + (x2 − 1)
2 ≤ 0.01
(x1 − 2.5)(x1 − 3) ≤ 0
(x2 − 2.5)(x2 − 3) ≤ 0
(x1 + 1)(x1 − 2) ≤ 0
(x2 + 1)(x2 − 2) ≤ 0
g(2, 1) : (x2 − 2.5)(x2 − 2.75) ≤ 0
ρ(1, 2) : (x1 − 2.6)
2 + (x2 − 2.8)
2 ≤ 0.01
Figure 3: Hybrid system of example 3
Example 3. Consider a hybrid system depicted in Figure 3, where
f1(x) =
(
2x1 + x2
x1x2 − x
2
2 − 1
)
, f2(x) =
(
x2
−x1 + x2
)
.
The system starts in location ℓ1, with an initial state in
Θ = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : (x1 − 1.5)
2 + x22 ≤ 0.25}.
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Our task is to verify the system never reach the states in
Xu(ℓ1) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : (x1 + 1)
2 + (x2 + 1)
2 ≤ 0.16}.
To prove the safety of the hybrid system, it suffices to find an inductive
invariant polynomial ϕ(x1, x2) which satisfies all the conditions in Theorem 6.
Using the same techniques illustrated in Examples 1 and 2, we obtain the
inductive invariant polynomial with rational coefficients
ϕ˜(x1, x2) = −
22
49
+
319
931
x1 −
251
931
x2 +
239
931
x21.
Moreover, ϕ˜ satisfies the conditions in Theorem 6 exactly. Therefore, the in-
ductive invariant can guarantee the safety of the hybrid system. More details
about the verification of conditions in Theorem 6, based on SOS representa-
tions of polynomials with rational coefficients can be found in Appendix.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we present a symbolic-numeric approach to compute in-
equality invariants for safety verification of hybrid systems. Employing SOS
relaxation and rational vector recovery techniques, it can be guaranteed that
an exact invariant, rather than a numerical one, can be obtained efficiently
and practically. This approach avoids both the weakness of numerical ap-
proaches to verify safety of hybrid systems and the high complexity of sym-
bolic invariant generation methods based on quantifier elimination.
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6. Appendix
Solution to Example 3:
The initial state Θ, the unsafe region Xu(ℓ1), the state invariant Ψ(ℓ),
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the guard condition g(ℓ, ℓ′) and the reset map ρ(ℓ, ℓ′) can be expressed as
Θ = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : θ1(x1, x2) ≥ 0},
Ψ(1) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : ψ1,1(x1, x2) ≥ 0 ∧ ψ1,2(x1, x2) ≥ 0},
Ψ(2) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : ψ2,1(x1, x2) ≥ 0 ∧ ψ2,2(x1, x2) ≥ 0},
g(1, 2) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : g12(x1, x2) ≥ 0},
g(2, 1) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : g21(x1, x2) ≥ 0},
ρ(1, 2) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : ρ12(x1, x2) ≥ 0},
ρ(2, 1) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : ρ21(x1, x2) ≥ 0},
Xu(1)(x1, x2) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R
2 : ζ1(x1, x2) ≥ 0},
where
θ1(x1, x2) = 0.25− (x1 − 1.5)
2 − x22,
ζ1(x1, x2) = 0.16− (x1 + 1)
2 − (x2 + 1)
2,
ψ1,1(x1, x2) = (x1 + 1)(2− x1), ψ1,2(x1, x2) = (x2 + 1)(2− x2),
ψ2,1(x1, x2) = (x1 − 2.5)(3− x1), ψ2,2(x1, x2) = (x2 − 2.5)(3− x2),
g12(x1, x2) = (x2 − 1.6)(2− x2), g21(x1, x2) = (x2 − 2.5)(2.75− x2),
ρ12(x1, x2) = 0.01− (x1 − 2.6)
2 − (x2 − 2.8)
2,
ρ21(x1, x2) = 0.01− (x1 − 1)
2 − (x2 − 1)
2.
Let the tolerance τ = 10−2, and the bound of the common denominator
of the polynomial coefficients vector be 1000, we can find that the inductive
invariant polynomial ϕ˜(x1, x2) satisfies
ϕ˜(x1, x2) = σ˜0(x1, x2) + σ˜1(x1, x2)θ1(x1, x2),
ϕ˜(x1, x2) = λ˜120(x1, x2) + λ˜121(x1, x2)g12(x1, x2) + γ˜12(x1, x2)ρ12(x1, x2),
ϕ˜(x1, x2) = λ˜210(x1, x2) + λ˜211(x1, x2)g21(x1, x2) + γ˜21(x1, x2)ρ21(x1, x2),
˙˜ϕ(x1, x2) = φ˜10(x1, x2) + φ˜11(x1, x2)ψ11(x1, x2) + φ˜12(x1, x2)ψ12(x1, x2) + ǫ1,
˙˜ϕ(x1, x2) = φ˜20(x1, x2) + φ˜21(x1, x2)ψ21(x1, x2) + φ˜22(x1, x2)ψ22(x1, x2) + ǫ2,
−ϕ˜(x1, x2) = µ˜0(x1, x2) + µ˜1(x1, x2)ζ1(x1, x2) + ǫ˜,
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where
ϕ˜(x1, x2) = −
22
49
+ 319
931
x1 −
251
931
x2 +
239
931
x21,
σ˜0(x1, x2) =
838
931
− 1565
931
x1 −
251
931
x2 +
867
931
x21 +
628
931
x22, σ˜1 =
628
931
,
λ˜120(x1, x2) =
8403
1900
− 4463
4655
x1 −
14169
4655
x2 +
472
931
x21 +
12
19
x22,
λ˜121 =
355
931
, γ˜12 =
233
931
,
λ˜210(x1, x2) =
133187
37240
− 1271
931
x1 −
1997
532
x2 +
1034
931
x21 +
1110
931
x22,
λ˜211 =
45
133
, γ˜21 =
795
931
,
φ˜10(x1, x2) =
153
931
+ 89
133
x1 +
298
931
x2 +
227
931
x1x2 +
971
931
x21 +
272
931
x22,
φ˜11 =
15
931
, φ˜12 =
3
133
, ǫ˜1 =
26
931
,
φ˜20(x1, x2) =
3751
931
− 3337
1862
x1 −
3373
1862
x2 +
349
931
x21 +
478
931
x1x2 +
319
931
x22,
φ˜21 =
349
931
, φ˜22 =
319
931
, ǫ˜2 =
1259
931
,
µ˜0(x1, x2) =
672
485
− 18
97
x1 +
137
97
x2 +
9
97
x1x2 +
66
97
x21 +
92
97
x22,
µ˜1 =
564
931
, ǫ˜ = 58
931
.
The exact SOS representations of above polynomials are as follows:
σ˜0(x1, x2) =
931
838
h211 +
3120712
2042055
h212 +
380230641
46469677
h213,
λ˜120(x1, x2) =
1900
8403
h221 +
127778819
13782225
h222 +
12831251475
2601209876
h223,
λ˜210(x1, x2) =
37240
133187
h231 +
991976776
205638355
h232 +
38289861701
13835779654
h233,
φ˜10(x, y) =
931
153
h241 +
142443
19415
h242 +
72301460
4096293
h243,
φ˜20(x, y) =
931
3751
h251 +
55874896
7767975
h252 +
7231984725
1110827906
h253,
µ˜0(x1, x2) =
3325
4992
h261 +
978432
235283
h262 +
29133446909
941925575
h263,
where
h11 =
838
931
− 251
1862
x2 −
1565
1862
x1, h12 =
2042055
3120712
x2 −
392815
3120712
x1, h13 =
46469677
380230641
x1.
h21 =
8403
1900
− 14169
9310
x2 −
4463
9310
x1, h22 =
13782225
127778819
x2 −
21078749
127778819
x1, h23 =
2601209876
12831251475
x1.
h31 =
133187
37240
− 1997
1064
x2 −
1271
1862
x1, h32 =
205638355
991976776
x2 −
12690935
35427742
x1, h33 =
13835779654
38289861701
x1.
h41 =
153
931
+ 149
931
x2 +
89
266
x1, h42 =
19415
142443
x2 −
29048
142443
x1, h43 =
4096293
72301460
x1.
h51 =
3751
931
− 3373
3724
x2 −
3337
3724
x1, h52 =
7767975
55874896
x2 +
3088123
55874896
x1, h53 =
1110827906
7231984725
x1.
h61 =
4992
3325
+ 197
266
x2 +
809
1862
x1, h62 =
235283
978432
x2 −
3984325
18590208
x1, h63 =
941925575
29133446909
x1.
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